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Honors Thesis
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Abstract

This thesis explores the guiding legal standard in child custody law, that custody should
be decided ‘in the best interests of the child.’ I begin with the most common critique of the best
interests standard: that it is too vague, allowing for the personal biases of judges to play too great
a role in custody decision-making. I challenge this critique by examining the standard in a
different context, shifting from divorce proceedings to the child welfare system, to ask how the
vagueness of the standard is mobilized differently in child protective proceedings. I argue that it
is not the individual biases of judges, but rather the historic, systemic biases, enabled by the
vague standard, which predominantly harm families and children. I examine how bias, privacy,
and poverty influence interpretations of the ‘best interests’ standard in a child welfare context,
through the lens of individualism as a dominant legal and political norm in the U.S.
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Introduction

“There can be no doubt that in every custody dispute the fundamental issue is the best
interest of the child.” (Ellerbe v. Hooks (1980), 490 Pa. 363 at 372)

Most people have some familiarity with child custody law in the context of divorce.
Almost half of all married couples in the United States get divorced1 and almost half of all
married couples’ children experience the divorce of their parents before the age of eighteen.2
Most people will come into contact with divorce either through personal experience or through
the experience of a friend or relative. The average U.S. citizen is less familiar with child custody
law in the context of the child welfare system. While child welfare institutions have an expansive
presence especially in larger cities, their impact is disproportionately concentrated among the
poor.3 The average U.S. citizen is thus less familiar with the child welfare system than the
phenomenon of divorce. I begin this thesis with a discussion of child custody law in the more
familiar context of divorce in order to prime a discussion of child custody law in the child
welfare system.
The guiding legal standard in child custody law is the ‘best interests of the child.’ The
literature on child custody law frequently addresses the difficulty of determining any given

“Marriage & Divorce.” American Psychological Association, American Psychological Association, 2000,
www.apa.org/topics/divorce/.
2
Fagan, Patrick F., and Robert Rector. The Effects of Divorce on America. Heritage Foundation, 2000. p. 1
3
“There are separate systems for poor and for wealthier families. Public child welfare departments that investigate
child maltreatment and place children in out-of-home care handle almost exclusively problems of poor families.”
Roberts, Dorothy E. Shattered Bonds: the Color of Child Welfare. Basic Civitas Books, 2002. p. 26
1
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child’s best interests in the midst of divorce proceedings in family court. Scholars criticize the
standard for its vulnerability to bias, claiming that its vagueness compels decision-makers to rely
upon personal beliefs about parenting and children. (Scott & Emery 2014, Elster, 1987; Fineman
& Opie, 1987; Mnookin 1975) Determining which factors will or will not meaningfully interfere
with a child’s upbringing and which of these factors might fairly and reasonably be brought into
the courtroom, require multifaceted, subjective assessments. Answering these difficult (often, as
some scholars claim, impossible4) questions, family court judges make decisions that drastically
impact individuals’ lives. The vagueness of the best interests standard combined with the
sensitivity, impactfulness, and personal nature of custody decisions, motivates scholars’ concern
with the standard’s susceptibility to bias. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of the standard allows
prejudicial decisions to be legitimized in the name of the ‘best interests of the child.’ I refer to
the standard’s inconclusiveness and consequent vulnerability to bias throughout this thesis as the
‘indeterminacy problem.’
However, the problem with the role bias plays in custody decision-making, especially in
the realm of child welfare law, is critically mischaracterized as a problem of inconclusiveness
and individual bias alone. Focus upon the standard’s practicability detracts from deeper inquiry
into the cultural, historic biases the standard’s indeterminacy permits. Scholars’ focus on
indeterminacy alone without critical analysis of what indeterminacy permits mischaracterizes the
harm at stake as incidental and individual rather than systemic and societal. To view prejudicial
applications of the standard as mere results of variable, individual biases is to ignore how deeply
ingrained these patterns of harm are in the child welfare system.

4

Elster, Jon ‘Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child,’ 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987)
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Section 1 surveys the best interests standard in divorce cases and the construction of the
bias at hand as an incidental, individual problem. Section 2 discusses the evolution of the legal
status of the child as an individual and the justification for state intervention into family privacy
on the individual child’s behalf. Section 3 argues that parenting rights are weaker than other
privacy rights because their exercise is inherently less individual. Section 4 argues that, due to a
construction of poverty as an individual problem, poor, often black mothers do not have privacy
rights in the child welfare system.

1. The Individualization of Bias: Limits of the Indeterminacy Critique

In every state, though often differentiated by state-specific stipulations called
‘intermediate rules’, the fundamental concern judges must consider in deciding custody cases is
the same: the best interests of the child.5 Yet the interests of the child are not the judge’s only
fundamental consideration. The Supreme Court has historically recognized "the interest of
parents in the care, custody and control of their children.” These interests are, as Justice
O’Connor proclaimed in Troxel v. Granville (2000), “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court."6 Both the indeterminate ‘best interests’ of the child as
well as the privacy rights of parents are fundamental considerations. Custody cases require
judges to balance and interpret these fundamental concerns, delivering highly impactful verdicts
for parents and children.

5
6

Ellerbe v. Hooks (1980), 490 Pa. 363 at 372
Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. at 65.
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During his 2005 confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts famously told the
Senate Judiciary Committee “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply
them.”7 However, in an area of law so bound up in cultural values, personal beliefs, and private
life as child custody, the role of the judge can hardly be likened to “calling balls and strikes.”8
While a more narrowly-tailored standard would lend itself to clearer parameters for interpretation
and make application an easier task for an impartial umpire, one theoretical upside of the best
interest standard’s broad indeterminacy is that it allows judges to consider the multitude of
factors unique to each family and circumstance. However, the degree of discretion judges
exercise in determining what is or is not within a child’s best interests, scholars argue, places a
concerning degree of power in the hands of the judge.9

The Indeterminacy Problem is Traditionally Critiqued as a Function of Individual
Bias

The indeterminacy problem has been criticized widely throughout child custody literature
as a function of individual bias.10 One of the most widely-cited critiques of the standard is Robert
Mnookin’s article, ‘Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy’ (1975). Mnookin claims that “what is ‘best’ or ‘least detrimental’ for a particular

Cillizza, Chris. “John Roberts, Umpire.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 28 June 2012,
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/john-roberts-umpire/2012/06/28/gJQAx5ZM9V_blog.html
8
Id.
9
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the
Best-Interests Standard , 77 Law and Contemporary Problems 69-108 (2014), Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987), Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law and Contemporary Problems 226-293
(Summer 1975)
10
Id.
7
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child is usually indeterminate and speculative” and that “there is good reason to be offended by
the breadth of power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolution of custody disputes.”11 In
an article building on Mnookin’s critique, ‘Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of
the Child’ (1989), political theorist Jon Elster also discusses the threat of indeterminacy in terms
of individual bias. Elster argues that in many cases, a truly impartial application of the standard
under the law renders no clear preference for either parent. This requires a broad qualitative
evaluation of often unknowable facts, prompting the judge to allow personal beliefs to fill an
inappropriate supplemental role. Elster argues that the subjective or moral reasoning judges rely
upon often reflects personal bias above a genuine assessment of children’s interests.

Intermediate Rules Adopted to Clarify the Best Interests Standard can Contribute
to the Indeterminacy Problem

To remedy the indeterminacy problem, many state legislatures have attempted to clarify
the best interests standard to decrease the risk of bias leading to unfair or biased decisions. Since
the adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970, and subsequent ratification by the American Bar
Association in 1974, most states have adopted legislation adding guiding parameters to state
custody laws. These parameters, called ‘intermediate rules’ delineate common factors in custody
cases to be considered by judges. Intermediate rules inform unique versions of the best interests
standard in each state.

Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law and
Contemporary Problems 226-293 (Summer 1975) Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol39/iss3/8
11
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The UMDA proposed some of the most widely accepted intermediate rules, including the
wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody, the wishes of the child as to his
custodian, and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.12 These rules explicitly
establish considerations to guide judges’ interpretation of the standard. Some intermediate rules
name factors; others establish presumptions about certain factors. A legal presumption is “a rule
of convenience based on experience or public policy or as a course of action that may be taken
without proof.”13 Presumptions are state-specific rules of thumb or guidelines based upon
understandings of what is usually within children’s interests. They may vary in strength, but they
usually support a default generalization judges rely upon in the absence of contrary evidence.
Intermediate rules can vary from considerations that seem implicit, such as the factors provided
in the UMDA, to more complex considerations, such as which parent is more likely to
cooperatively facilitate the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent14 or the presence of
domestic violence in a household.15
The state-by-state variety of intermediate rules is partially due to differences in values
throughout the country. It is also partially the result of the independent evolution of doctrine
within individual state court systems. Family law in the U.S. differs not only by state code but
also by unique precedent developed in each state’s courts.16 Though most state’s codes specify
intermediate rules, case law establishing how factors should be weighted or interpreted also

12

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. (1970). Uniform marriage and divorce act. § 402
Buehler, Cheryl, and Jean M. Gerard. “Divorce Law in the United States: A Focus on Child Custody.” Family
Relations, vol. 44, no. 4, 1995, p. 441
14
This intermediate rule, a ‘Friendly Parent’ Provision, exists in forty-two states. Saunders, Daniel G, Ph.D. State
Laws Related to Family Judges' and Custody Evaluators' Recommendations in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence:
Final Summary Overview Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, March 2017 p.
2
15
Saunders, Daniel G. p. 3
16
Fineman, Martha. The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies. Routledge,
1995. p. 29
13
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contributes to the variation. There is a wide breadth of ‘best interests’ interpretations available to
family court judges. Judges may base decisions upon a variety of interpretations by courts within
their state or the opinions of courts in other states. The variety of intermediate rules, in and of
itself, demonstrates the problem of indeterminacy. There is a clear need for specification, yet
efforts to specify the standard take varied directions.
Intermediate rules prompt consideration of non-constitutional factors, authorizing judges
to look outside the law and into society. With children mentioned nowhere in the Constitution,
judges may find scientific or cultural norms useful in order to establish what is generally
conducive to positive child development. The most widely influential scientific signpost to
which intermediate rules conform is the research of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
Solnit in three publications: Beyond The Best Interests Of The Child (1973,) Before the Best
Interests Of The Child (1979,) and In The Best Interests Of The Child (1986).17 Based upon their
findings about childhood development, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit recommend “that custody
should be decided swiftly, irreversibly, and without court-imposed visitation rights to the
noncustodial parent, thus enabling the child to have a stable, undisturbed relationship with one
adult person.”18 Two common intermediate rules the research of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
supports are primary caretaker preferences (preferences for the parent who has spent more time

17

Spinak, Jane. “When Did Lawyers for Children Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the
Twentieth Century on Best Interests and the Role of the Child Advocate.” Family Law Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 2,
2007, pp. 393–411. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25740616.
18
Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (cited in note 2); Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert
J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979); Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert J. Solnit, and Sonja
Goldstein, In the Best Interests of the Child (1986).
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with the child)19 and psychological parent preferences (preferences for the parent who has
developed an emotional parent-child bond with the child.)20
While relatively straightforward presumptions such as primary caretaker preferences may
come down to a dispute of determinable facts, complex intermediate rules do not always make
the best interests standard more determinate. Take for example a rule that requires judges to
consider the presence of domestic violence in the household as a factor in determination of the
child’s best interests. The mere presence of domestic violence within a household does not, in
and of itself, inform a clear singular course of action. Furthermore, a judge considering domestic
violence as an intermediate factor may be influenced by social norms surrounding gender roles,
functional inequality and power structures.
Family law scholar Martha Fineman discusses the influence of cultural norms in law,
writing, “law is a crude and limited device and is circumscribed by the dominant ideologies of
the society in which it is produced.” Classification, “the process whereby facts are given legal
meaning... relies on broad generalizations about groups or classes of things and people.”21
Fineman claims that facts classified for legal purposes bear the residue of dominant social
ideologies. Judges’ potentially prejudicial opinions bear this residue. The residue of dominant
social ideologies may offer useful scaffolding to clarify the ambiguities of more complex
intermediate rules.
Furthermore, complex intermediate rules that create additional ambiguity may increase
the potential for manipulation of the speculative ‘facts’ of a case. Elster discusses the potential
for strategic manipulation in terms of intermediate rules and bargaining power. A vague best
19

Elster, Jon, p. 11
Buehler, Cheryl, and Jean M. Gerard. p. 441
21
Fineman, Martha. p. 18
20
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interests standard, unweighted by intermediate factors, may invite protracted litigation. The
parent with greater financial ability may draw out the dispute until the other party’s resources are
exhausted in order to gain an advantage. Adding complex intermediate rules to the standard can
create unintended bargaining incentives, increasing its susceptibility to manipulation by
opportunistic litigants.

Friendly Parent Provisions can Create Differentials in Bargaining Power,
Contributing to the Indeterminacy Problem

‘Friendly parent’ provisions, complex intermediate rules added to clarify the best
interests standard, may often create unintended differentials in litigants’ bargaining power. These
presumptions give priority to whichever parent appears more willing to facilitate contact and
visitation with the other. They may exacerbate the power dynamics of abusive relationships by
unfairly disadvantaging a parent seeking custody in order to protect a child from an abusive
partner. For example, Ohio family courts follow a ‘friendly parent provision’ and may award
joint custody even where both parents do not seek shared parenting responsibilities.22 State laws
such as Ohio’s which presume joint custody is in a child’s best interests and regard parental
‘cooperativeness’ as a positive factor may pressure a victimized parent into agreeing to joint
custody, so as to not risk losing any form of custody.

22

“If at least one parent files a pleading or motion… and a plan for shared parenting... and if a plan for shared
parenting is in the best interest of the children and is approved by the court… the court may allocate the parental
rights and responsibilities for the care of the children to both parents and issue a shared parenting order” 31 Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.04 Allocating parental rights and responsibilities for care of children - shared parenting.
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Custody law scholars discuss the potential for strategic manipulation under friendly
parent provisions in states such as Ohio, where courts consider parental cooperativeness a
positive intermediate factor. Friendly parent provisions are intermediate factors to the best
interests standard in forty-two states.23 In the twelve states with friendly parent provisions that
presume joint custody is better for children,24 family law scholar Jan Hagen argues that parents
who don't want joint custody may “ipso facto r eveal themselves as not fit for sole custody either”
which “creates a dangerous incentive for strategic behavior.”25 Parties litigating for joint custody
who may appear ‘friendlier’ and therefore more fit gain an advantage, while parties litigating for
sole custody, even if only to protect their child from an abusive spouse, are disadvantaged. A
parent who believes the other to be dangerous is discouraged from litigating for sole custody. At
the same time, “the more 'unfit' the parent requesting joint custody, the more bargaining leverage
that parent gains” for their ‘cooperativeness.’26 Custody law scholar Richard Garner adds, "[i]f
people are indeed litigating for joint custody [i.e., if one parent demands joint custody against the
wish of the other], they are generally not likely to be candidates for it."27 Friendly parent
provisions that may be easily manipulated can lead to custody decisions that are not in children’s
best interests.
The more indeterminate the standard, the greater the role strategy may play in litigation.
If one accepts the premise that the best interests standard alone often cannot produce finely-tuned
results, differentials in litigants’ bargaining power become critical. Some individuals will always

23

Saunders, Daniel G, p. 2
Id. p. 2
25
Hagen, Jan L. ‘Proceed with Caution: Advocating Joint Custody’ Social Work, Vol. 32, No. 1 Oxford University
Press (January–February 1987)  p. 27
26
Elster, Jon. p. 6 fn 22.
27
Gardner, Richard A. Joint Custody is Not for Everyone, Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 63, p. 70 (1984)
24
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be inclined to to take advantage of the standard, especially where the stakes are high and the
standard is vague. Considering parents’ frequently substantial investment in the outcome of
custody disputes, complex and manipulable intermediate rules can exacerbate rather than
mitigate the indeterminacy problem.

Domestic Violence Provisions can add Ambiguity, Contributing to the
Indeterminacy Problem

While intermediate rules can make the standard more determinate, they can also
introduce additional ambiguity. They may produce unintended consequences when combined or
force courts to consider complex variables without sufficient protocol. One intermediate rule that
can contribute to the standard’s indeterminacy is the consideration of domestic violence in the
household. Some form of this intermediate rule exists in every state.28 Most states, however,
leave it up to judges to determine what inferences to draw from domestic violence as a factor. A
minority of states that have friendly parent provisions, eight, make exceptions in cases of
domestic violence (i.e. if a parent is a victim of domestic violence then they are exempt from the
friendly parent provision, so as not to be coerced into ‘cooperative’ litigation behavior.)29
However, the majority of states with friendly parent provisions, thirty-four, do not include
exemptions for victims of domestic violence. A 2017 report commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Justice finds that “even in jurisdictions with a presumption that custody should be
awarded to the non-abusive parent, a ‘friendly parent’ provision tends to override this

28
29

Saunders, Daniel G. p. 3
Id. p. 3
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presumption.”30 Even where domestic violence is specified as a factor, the intermediate rule itself
does not necessarily compel a specific approach or sensitivity to the issue. A parent who is a
victim of domestic violence may be forced to agree to joint custody and cooperate with an
abusive partner under friendly parent provisions in states that favor joint custody.
Scholars also note that factors such as domestic violence are “difficult to verify, and
courts are often ill-equipped to separate valid claims from those that are weak or false.”31 Taking
into account the cultural, in addition to the individual biases that play into applications of
complex intermediate rules, one can see how such rules can actually exacerbate the
indeterminacy problem. A judge who sympathizes with survivors of domestic violence may
consider the issue by recognizing the value of giving custody to the victimized parent and
granting an order of protection against the perpetrator. A judge who does not may consider the
issue by deeming the home unsafe and removing the child.
In Nicholson v. Scoppetta ( 2004)32, the Court of Appeals of New York (the highest court
in the state) addressed the ambiguity of domestic violence provisions. The court established an
interpretation of the provision sympathetic to victims of domestic violence. The Court of
Appeals assessed whether the Association for Children's’ Services (ACS) could remove children
from battered mothers solely for having exposed their children to domestic abuse. The case
addressed three related questions: Whether the sole allegation that a child had witnessed
domestic abuse against a caretaker could constitute ‘neglect’, whether this would constitute
'danger' or 'risk' to the child's 'life or health’ and whether this alone could be grounds for ACS to

Saunders, Daniel G. p. 2
 lizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the
E
Best-Interests Standard , 77 Law and Contemporary Problems 69-108 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol77/iss1/4 p. 70
32
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004).
30
31
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conclude that removal would be ‘necessary’ or ‘in the child's best interests.’33 Child neglect is
usually ambiguously defined in state courts. (In Section 4 I will discuss how neglect is easily
conflated with poverty.) The ambiguity of child neglect allows for judges to define neglect
according to their own interpretations. The court in Nicholson addressed this ambiguity, holding
that merely exposing one’s child to abusive conduct to which one is victim could not constitute
neglect. The court held that proof of neglect would require a showing of actual harm or imminent
harm at the hands of the caretaker.34 The court also held that repeatedly exposing a child to abuse
without awareness of the potential for harm could constitute neglect, but that a ‘reasonable and
prudent’ parent might not be able to act to protect themselves or their child for fear of
exacerbating the violence.35
The New York Court of Appeals in Nicholson addressed a complex intermediate custody
rule which specified a factor for consideration, domestic violence, yet introduced ambiguity
around how the factor should be considered. The decision established a protocol attuned to the
particular situation of battered mothers. Yet, in most states, the manner in which domestic
violence is considered is left fully up to the court and the outcome of a custody battle for a victim
of domestic violence may vary significantly depending on the judge assigned to the case. For
example, Ohio establishes a presumption that domestic violence is contrary to a child’s best
interests but does not specify what (if anything) a court should do if the victimized parent lives
with the perpetrator and would require assistance to secure safe and independent housing.36

N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1022, 1024, 1027, N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1028, 1052(b)(i)(A)
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004) at 849.
35
Id at 363.
36
“In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section… the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to… Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domestic violence.”
31 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.04 Allocating parental rights and responsibilities for care of children - shared
parenting.
33
34
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Could a Coin Toss Remedy the Indeterminacy Problem?

Elster claims that the problem of indeterminacy cannot be legislated away merely by
adding intermediate rules to the best interests standard. While he concedes that some rules are
relatively more effective than others, he argues that many critical facets of any potential custody
outcome are universally unknowable. In many cases, Elster correctly argues that it is impossible
to establish a rational basis for a finding of what would be in any given child’s best interests.
This is due both to the exhaustive breadth of factors a judge might consider and to the difficulty
of assessing these factors from an objective standpoint. While in theory, intermediate rules
should clarify the vague best interests standard, they may also add ambiguity or create strategic
incentives in combination with other rules. Furthermore, a rule might benefit certain individuals
while imposing unintended consequences upon others, promote efficiency at the expense of
ethical procedure or prompt a consideration of factors the judge lacks adequate means to assess.
Additionally, parents often experience difficulty accurately demonstrating their fitness to
the court in the midst of divorce proceedings. Judith Wallerstein, an influential divorce
psychologist, discusses the ‘diminished capacity to parent’ individuals experience during a
divorce. Due to the stress of the process judges may not gain an accurate picture of parenting
ability during divorce litigation.37 After surveying several barriers to unbiased custody
adjudication, Elster claims that fair decision-making under any discretionary standard, with or
without intermediate rules, is usually outright impossible.

Wallerstein, J. S., & Kelly, J. B. (1980). Surviving the breakup: How children and Parents Cope With Divorce.
New York Basic Books.
37
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The best interests standard, Elster concludes, belongs to a category of indeterminate
legal standards which govern impossible decisions yet are rationalized as workeable because
legal institutions have a vested interest in affirming (or producing) the legitimacy of the law.38
Judges will often inevitably rely upon non-child factors such as the greater implications of a
decision or the message it sends, the character or strategic tactics either party exhibits during
litigation, or incidental personal preferences. Elster argues that the standard’s vulnerability to
individual bias often leads to an expensive, time-consuming, and irrational decision-making
process, ultimately more emotionally and financially costly than it is productive. The emotional
toll of divorce litigation Wallerstein discusses may cause more harm to parents and children than
the outcome of divorce litigation is worth. Rather than fine-tuning the vague best interests
standard with specific intermediate rules, Elster proposes doing away with a discretionary
standard altogether.
Elster endorses a hypothetical posed by Mnookin: if neither parent is deemed unfit then
custody could be decided by coin toss rather than litigation. Elster argues, “random choice is
appropriate when other criteria would force us to compare the intrinsic worth of persons…
Although the best interest analysis ostensibly scrutinizes the mother and the father only with
respect to their fitness for custody, it is easily understood as a judgment on their worth more
generally.”39 Elster argues that this shift from consideration of fitness for custody to judgement
of personal worth, a function of the indeterminacy problem, renders the best interests standard
more detrimental than beneficial to litigants.

38
39

Elster, Jon, p. 29
Elster, Jon, p. 43

18

Elster claims that resolving custody disputes with a coin toss instead of tedious litigation
that introduces opportunities for bias and strategy would produce equally just results in all but a
small minority of cases in which there are reasonably discernible differences in parental fitness.
Furthermore, the immediacy of a coin toss makes it procedurally best for children as custody
litigation causes children emotional harm. While the coin toss, as Mnookin claims, would
“deprive the parents of a process and a forum where their anger and aspirations might be
expressed" and that "symbolic and participatory values of adjudication would be lost by a
random process”40 Elster emphasizes that such process costs are often the only difference
between random selection and costly litigation. Elster claims that arguing for the process
‘benefits’ of litigation comes “dangerously close to arguing that it is better for something other
than justice to be done and seen than for justice to be done but not seen.”41
Elster’s coin toss heuristic is an extreme hypothetical intended to demonstrate a point
(that in many cases the standard’s indeterminacy renders it unproductive) rather than propose a
solution. Elster is a theorist of human rationality, not a family court attorney or judge. Any
family court attorney or judge would likely argue that to replace their positions with a single
coin-tossing staff member in divorce custody cases would be impossible and/or unethical, and I
would agree. However, let us momentarily take the coin toss solution as a serious proposal. If we
replace the best interests standard with a coin toss in divorce custody cases and this indeed
proves fair, it would demonstrate the extent of the indeterminacy problem. The standard would
be shown to be so indeterminate that it might as well be replaced by random selection.
Indeterminacy in divorce custody cases would appear to be the extent of the unfairness.

40
41

Mnookin, Robert. P. 39
Elster, Jon. p. 36
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In a majority of divorce cases Elster claims that both parents are, as far as a court could
reasonably determine, equally fit, and in these cases a coin toss would be fair. Contrary to
Elster’s claims, I am inclined to believe that there is more to procedural fairness than mere
appearances. However, setting procedural fairness aside for a moment, what might be fair about
a coin toss in divorce custody cases would be distinctly unfair in child welfare cases. Substitute a
coin toss for the best interests standard in the child welfare system, in child protective
proceedings, and we shall see that the source of unfairness in this context is more than mere
indeterminacy. Applying the coin toss proposal to child protective proceedings illustrates the
difference between the indeterminacy problem in divorce custody cases and the indeterminacy
problem in the child welfare system.
The reason that a coin toss might be a fair solution in divorce cases is that the parties
vying for custody are both parents who are for all discernable purposes equally fit to care for a
child. Of course, there are cases in which parents are not similarly situated. Differentials in
litigants’ bargaining power, such as the power dynamics of abusive relationships, further inhibit
fair applications of the best interests standard. However, Elster’s coin toss hypothetical concerns
the majority of divorce custody cases, in which he claims both parents are similarly situated and
equally fit. Because both parents are equally fit and similarly situated, tossing a coin eliminates
costly and detrimental litigation at little cost to fairness.
Elster’s coin toss hypothetical exemplifies the extent to which indeterminacy is a
problem in divorce custody cases: the potential for individual bias is so great that in the face of
process costs, divorcing families might as well forgo litigation. In the following sections, I will
discuss the best interests standard in the child welfare system. In in child protective proceedings,
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the indeterminacy of the best interests standard allows for greater harm than the incidental,
individual bias Elster argues it permits in divorce cases. In child protective cases, the parties are
not similarly situated, equally fit parents. Due to the differences in litigants and the nature of the
bias at hand in child protective cases, a coin toss would not be an adequate solution. The
inadequacy of the coin toss hypothetical illuminates differences between divorce and child
protective custody cases, which render a vague, indeterminate standard a far greater danger in the
child welfare system.

2. The Individualization of the Child: From Property to Victimized Individual

In this section, I will explore how the child is constructed in the individualistic terms of
the U.S. legal system, informing applications of the best interests standard in the child welfare
system. The child as a legal subject is constructed as an individual and victim. U.S. legal
discourse understands the victimization of the child independently from the victimization of
parents or the family unit. This narrative is detrimental to families involved in the child welfare
system where parents are understood in contrast to child victims as perpetrators by default.
Focused upon the individual victimized child, child welfare cases treat parents punitively. This
focus upon parental misconduct simplifies the cause of harm as an individual cause, independent
from larger societal forces. To only focus upon the child as a victim is to ignore that the
conditions of the child’s life depend upon the conditions of the family. While children are
individuals with independent needs, the victimization of the individual child ignores the
interdependence of children’s and families’ needs and the dependence of families’ needs upon
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access to social resources. The legal construct of the child as an individual victim obfuscates the
larger picture of the harm at stake in the child welfare system, harm that implicates not only
individuals but society at large.
In Section 1 I discussed the indeterminacy problem as a function of individual bias in
divorce custody cases. This section will discuss child custody and the best interests standard in
the context of the child welfare system through the lens of the individual victimization of the
child. The following sections will argue that the indeterminacy problem in the child welfare
system poses a greater threat than the mere influence of individual bias; the indeterminacy
problem in the child welfare system enables cultural, historic patterns of harm.

The Best Interests Standard is the Same in Child Welfare and Divorce Cases, but
the Court Procedure is Different

While the controlling legal standard, the ‘best interests of the child,’ is the same in
divorce custody cases and in the child welfare system, child protective proceedings (cases in the
child welfare system) involve different procedure. Child protective proceedings are initiated by a
report of abuse or neglect to a child protective agency. When a state child protective agency
elects to pursue a child welfare investigation in court a series of hearings commences. It is worth
noting that state agencies do not initiate a court action in every case. They may work with
families to deter court proceedings. This process may involve referral to services, agency
supervision “or even requesting - with an implied threat of court action if the parent refuses - that
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the parent agrees to a ‘safety plan,’ which can include changing the child's physical custody.”42
However, before a child is placed in foster care, there is a standard procedure which agencies
are, at least on paper, required to follow. Though the child welfare court process varies by state,
there are certain standard procedural steps.
A child protective case begins with a court-ordered investigation. The agency may file an
‘emergency removal order,’ alleging imminent danger to the child, asking the court to
temporarily place the child in state custody before making its decision. In a preliminary hearing,
the parents and agency present evidence to a family court judge who decides whether the child
will stay at home or in state custody before the trial. Next, in a fact-finding hearing, the judge
determines whether abuse or neglect has occurred. This is followed by a dispositional hearing, in
which the judge determines whether to place the child in state custody (foster care) or to return
the child to their family home. If the child is placed in foster care, the agency and the judge
determine a visitation schedule and a case plan which parents must follow in order to be reunited
with their children. A case plan often includes mandatory participation in government service
programs such as vocational training or parenting classes. The court conducts review hearings to
monitor the parent’s participation in the case plan. After twelve to eighteen months, the court
holds a permanency hearing, in which the judge may reunite the family or terminate parental
rights. In a final hearing, if the judge decides to terminate parental rights, the child is
permanently placed in state custody until they ‘age out’ (when the child reaches eighteen in most
states) or are adopted.43
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Children are Constructed as Individual Victims As Legal Subjects in the Child Welfare
System

Section 1 examined the indeterminacy of the best interests standard from the standpoint
of the individual biases of judges. Another aspect of the standard’s indeterminacy is the
ambiguous position of the child as a legal subject. While children cannot independently define
their own interests, their interests are presumed to be independent from the interests of their
families. Interests, like rights, are understood in an individualistic legal system as exclusive
properties of individuals. Dominant U.S. political thought constructs citizens as individuals in
relation to society. Individual rights are the principal benefit this relationship begets. Because the
relationship is between the individual and society, rights are tied to individuals, not groups.44
Thus, the individual interests of the child are more easily understood in U.S. legal discourse than
the collective or relational interests of family units.
It is more difficult for judges in an individualistic legal system to recognize the gravity of
a child’s interest in the continuance of family relationships, in remaining within their family
home, than, for instance, a child’s projected interest in living in a two-income household. The
fundamentally individual construction of rights is complicated by children who are intrinsically,
socially and legally considered dependent but viewed independently in their capacity as
rights-recipients. Childrens’ dependency is incorporated in their characterization as victims,
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passive subjects in need of protection. Yet dependency is left out of the characterization of
children’s interests as independent and individual. Because children cannot directly articulate
their interests, their interests are instead subject to determination by a largely indeterminate
standard. These interests are easily molded by the norms of the legal system. Legal individualism
minimizes considerations of parent-child relationships in judicial ‘best interests’ calculations.
In most legal disputes, ‘interests’ can be understood straightforwardly; a party’s interests
are synonymous with the party’s desires. Yet ‘best interests’ are not always synonymous with
express desires, even for adults. Certainly, adult litigants are capable of having desires that do
not align with what would be best for them. However, because adults are presumed to be capable
of recognizing this potential disparity, for better or for worse, they are in most cases at liberty to
define their own legal interests. Children, on the other hand, do not necessarily possess the same
capacity for differentiation. Children may not be able to reliably articulate their desires, and their
desires, if articulated, cannot reliably be called their interests. While thirty-three states consider
the express desires of children in determining their best interests (intermediate rules in these
states specify consideration of the child’s wishes,) the remaining seventeen states do not
explicitly consider children’s wishes.45 Recognizing differences between adults and children,
courts usually do not consider the express interests of children and the ‘best interests’ of children
as being synonymous.
This is not to say that children are incapable of knowing what would be best for them or
to discount the claim that often in fact children know more about their own best interests than
adults. However, children and adults are treated differently under the law due to intrinsic
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differences such as developmental capacity, as well as situational differences such as the child’s
dependency within the social institution of the family. Because it would be frequently
detrimental to children and socially considered morally irresponsible, children are not granted
the same liberty as adults to define their own legal interests.
The ambiguity of children’s legal position presents a challenge to family courts. Though
constructed as independent victims, children are both functionally dependent in the sense that
they rely upon caretakers and also discursively dependent in the sense that they rely upon adults
to define their legal interests in court. Nonetheless, children are constructed as independent legal
subjects whose interests, once defined, have a fundamental influence upon the outcome of
custody disputes. Because the task of determining a child’s best interests is so difficult, in
contentious litigation, courts often appoint attorneys or trained volunteers as guardians ad litem
to participate in court on the child’s behalf. Guardians ad litem are solely responsible for
advocating for the child and represent the child’s individual independent interests. Guardians ad
litem thus embody the legal construction of the child as a victimized individual.

Historical Context Explains the Individualization of the Child

The appointment of guardians ad litem became more prevalent across states in the 1970s,
after a landmark Supreme Court case, In Re Gault (1967) and the enactment of the the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) federally in 1974. The 1970s saw an immense
increase in pressure upon the child welfare system. Family law scholar Josh Gupta-Kagan notes
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the number of reports of child abuse and neglect “increased eightfold between 1963 and 1980.”46
Gupta-Kagan argues that the passage of CAPTA and Gault initiated transformations of the legal
status of the child and the child welfare system into their modern forms: the child constructed as
an individual victim and the bureaucratic institution that supports this construct.47
Though it did not not directly pertain to to the child welfare system, the Gault decision
influenced the individualization of children as legal subjects in the child welfare system. The
Supreme Court in Gault held that a minor facing juvenile delinquency charges was entitled to
counsel and that the minor’s parents were entitled to notification of the charges.48 Child welfare
and juvenile justice scholar Jane Spinak notes the connection between Gault and the
individualization of children’s interests via guardian ad litem representation: “While the
Supreme Court has never held that children subject to state intervention as victims of child
maltreatment are similarly entitled to counsel, only seven years after the Gault decision, in 1974,
[with the passage of CAPTA,] the federal government began requiring states to provide children
with some form of representation of their interests in child protective proceedings as one of the
conditions of drawing down federal foster care funding.”49 Gupta-Kagan contextualizes the Gault
decision similarly, arguing the “watershed decision in Gault denounced the absence of due
process in family-court trials and required dramatic reforms - "constitutional domestication,’”50
transforming the child welfare system in addition to the juvenile justice system.
The effects of Gault were wide-reaching for children as legal subjects. While there is no
similar Supreme Court case in child welfare law, Spinak and Gupta-Kagan argue that the passage
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of CAPTA was influenced by the ‘constitutional domestication’ Gault heralded. In addition to
conditioning federal funding upon states’ appointments of guardians ad litems,51 CAPTA also
expanded the reach of child protective agencies by increasing their funding, and conditioning
state funding upon passage of laws requiring professionals to report suspected child abuse or
neglect. Gupta-Kagan writes, “the child protection administrative state grew increasingly
complex in the years after Gault.”52 The expansion of the child welfare system occurred
simultaneously with the formalization and increase of legal procedure solidifying the
construction of the child as an individual victimized legal subject. Both the expansion of the
child welfare system and the victimized individual construct of the child shape mobilizations of
the best interests standard in present day child protective proceedings.
The individualization of the child can be seen in contrast to the British common law
doctrine of coverture, a predecessor to U.S. family law jurisprudence. Under the doctrine of
coverture, children were legally considered property, devoid of rights, legal protections, or legal
recognition of their humanity. From the emergence of U.S. jurisprudence through the early
nineteenth century, U.S. courts relied upon the doctrine of coverture. Under coverture, the law
understood the household hierarchically; husbands, as heads of the house, owned all marital
property, including children. Upon entering a marriage, women gave up the right to own
property and in the event of a dissolution of the marriage contract men automatically gained
custody of any children of the marriage. Fathers, as sole property owners of the household
gained custody automatically in divorce. A custody dispute was therefore a question of
ownership resolved simply by the fact that only one party could legally have property rights.53
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After the doctrine of coverture began to lose influence in the 1880s but prior to the
widespread adoption of the best interests standard in the 1970s, family courts applied the ‘tender
years’ doctrine.54 The tender years doctrine allocated custody in divorce to mothers, who were
considered more fit to care for young children of ‘tender years’ by virtue of their gender. Based
in gender-role stereotypes, the doctrine served children’s interests only incidentally as societal
gender roles more frequently render women more experienced caretakers. While the tender years
doctrine employed gender-role stereotypes, it allegedly did so on the basis the child’s wellbeing,
only presuming that women are better parents. In this sense, the tender years doctrine can be
understood as a precursor to the child-centered but gender neutral best interests standard, only it
codified a particular gendered interpretation of these interests. The ‘tender years’ doctrine
established a maternal preference in name of children’s interests before these interests became
the fundamental named consideration in custody disputes. Over the course of the the 20th
century the period during which courts presumed a child would be better cared for by its mother
expanded from infancy to the teen years.55 Yet by the turn of the century these statutes which
discriminated explicitly on the basis of sex were widely struck down under equal protection
challenges. The modern best interests standard emerged in their place.
As the child welfare system expanded in the 1970s under the best interests standard, the
child gained a legal status opposite from that of property (as under the doctrine of coverture.)
The child came to be constructed as an independent individual legal subject. However, the
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victimization of the child as an independent legal subject obscures the interdependence of
families and the historic, cultural harm families are subjected to in the child welfare system.

The Individual Victimization of the Child Presupposes a False Conflict of Interests
Between Children and Parents

In the modern child welfare system the interests of the individualized child are
constructed in opposition to the rights of parents. This conflict is articulated throughout both
liberal and conservative political rights discourses. The expansion of parental rights is often
politicized as an item on the conservative agenda and aligned with the expansion of religious
liberties.56 Strangely, in the related legal realm of abortion and contraceptive rights, the rights of
parents are traditionally aligned with a liberal platform. The difference between child-rearing
debates and abortion/contraception debates is that in the latter the ‘child’ who cannot speak,
whose interests must therefore be defined by proxy–who is spoken-for via politicized
construct–is an unborn fetus. Yet the central ‘conflict’ of rights in these two areas of rights
discourse (rights concerning how to raise children and rights concerning whether to raise
children) is the same. Whether or not a fetus may rightly be be considered a child or human
subject, the fundamental liberty interest asserted on its behalf is the ‘best interests of the child.’
Whether the subject is a living child or fetus, both debates pit its alleged ‘best interests,’
constructed independently from the interests of its parents, against its parents’ privacy rights. (In
the following section, I will explore parenting rights as privacy rights. Parenting rights are part of
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a non-individual form of privacy, family privacy, which entails necessary interference with
children.)
However, insofar as (potential) parent and (potential) child might be considered separate
individuals, their ‘individual’ interests are mutually constituted. For example, a parent’s decision
to have or not to have a child likely rests upon their ability or lack of ability to provide care.
Ability, which informs the potential parent’s interests, also plays a major role in the theoretical
stake the potential child would have in being born. To recognize this is to recognize that the
interests of parent and child, potential or actual, are mutually constitutive. The legal construction
of the child as a victimized individual obscures this mutuality.
When the rights in question are not abortion rights but parenting rights, conservatives are
in favor of their expansion. Conservatives have won expansions of parenting liberties where
these liberties are aligned with religious freedom. (In such cases, parenting rights are arguably
actually incompatible with children’s interests. See Wisconsin v. Yoder expanding parental rights
at the expense of children’s access to public education.)57 However, the liberal counter-motion to
minimize parental rights in favor of an ‘individual/victim’ construct of the
child-in-need-of-protection furthers a simplistic narrative at the expense of harm to families.
What courts fail to recognize in both liberal and conservative interpretations of the ‘conflict’ of
parents’ and children's’ rights is how the interests of the (potential) parent and (potential) child
are not individual interests. They are only misrepresented as such via dominant legal and
political norms. The individualistic legal system which presumes parent and child to be in
conflict privileges the interests of the individualized child over the rights of its parents,
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especially when these parents belong to demographics whose family privacy has historically
been diminished.

The State’s Power to Intervene in Child Welfare Cases on Behalf of the Individual
Child Victim is a Function of its Parens Patriae Power

The government’s right to intervene in the private family realm on behalf of children is
known as its parens patriae powers (latin for ‘parent of the nation.’) Parens patriae powers
evolved alongside the emergence of the modern child welfare system and construction of the
child as a legal subject. Via parens patriae powers states assume responsibility for children in
the place of parents who allegedly neglect or abuse parental responsibilities. States assume these
rights and responsibilities generally held by parents as matter of public interest. Parens patriae
powers allow states to take custody of children found by a court to have been neglected or
abused. When a state child protective agency (or a private agency contracted by a state) removes
children from their parents and places them into foster care the state can be said to be exercising
its parens patriae powers.
In the early 1800s the role of the U.S. government expanded in the personal lives of
citizens. Following this shift, the state began to intervene more frequently in children’s lives.58
In the early 1900s, parens patriae p owers expanded as states assumed increasing responsibility
for children. The first example of a state exercising its parens patriae power in U.S. history is the
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1874 case of Mary Ellen McCormick, a child who suffered parental abuse.59 McCormick’s
advocates were “initially compelled to approach the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals to secure her protection from abusive parents.”60 Legal and social work theorist Mary
Kay Kisthardt explains, “The legal system that responded was one that was built on discretionary
decision-making and the substitution of the court as parent.”61
The legal system of the 1900s was comprised of state juvenile courts, established at the
beginning of the century to deal with troubled youth. Juvenile courts also dealt with cases of
child neglect. Family law scholar Mark Soler argues that the juvenile court system of the 1900s
“embodied the doctrine of parens patriae and became its symbol.”62 State intervention on behalf
of neglected children is part of the larger a shift in child law in which children, once conceived
of as property of fathers, became not full citizens but nonetheless independent individuals. The
modern child welfare system is an outgrowth of the juvenile court and the authority to remove
children is likewise representative of parens patriae powers.
In the following sections, I will discuss how state interventions into the family home
encroaching upon family privacy are legitimized in the name of protecting children as victimized
individuals. In Section 4, I will discuss poverty as a deeper, underlying cause of child neglect.
Poverty is one of the main predictive factors of child neglect63 and the sole issue in 74.9 percent
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of child protective proceedings.64 The construction of the individual victimization of the child at
the hands of individual parents does not acknowledge poverty as a societal harm. I will discuss
the impact of the dominant cultural narratives that portray poverty as evidence of individual
failure rather than social harm in the child welfare system. The projection of guilt upon the
individual parent constructed as perpetrator of the child’s victimization diminishes social
responsibility for poverty. This furthers the subjection of parents in the child welfare system to
patterns of harm based in cultural, historic racism and classism.

3. The Individualization of Privacy and The Non-Interference Condition

In this section I will argue that the individualistic construction of privacy rights in U.S.
jurisprudence weakens parenting rights. Parenting, as any parent can tell you, involves some of
the the most difficult, significant and personal decisions one can make. From seemingly
mundane choices of everyday family life to choices that have the power to alter a child's life,
parenting decisions are fundamentally personal in the sense that they require more than merely
weighing options and outcomes. Beyond practical calculations, parenting decisions evoke
personal values and belief systems, draw upon past experiences and reflect cultural backgrounds.
Accordingly, the freedom to make these decisions is one many hold dear. Parenthood may
represent a core part of one’s identity. One’s stake in one’s ability to make choices for one’s
child may be tied to the parent-child relationship, as an integral part of one’s sense of self.
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In custody disputes, otherwise non-critical parenting decisions attain a degree of
significance beyond the scope of their immediate outcomes. Decisions such as which therapist a
child should see65 are real and common points of contention in expensive, protracted divorce
court litigation. What motivates these conflicts is likely not the specific point of contention alone
but more broadly the freedom to make the type of choice one deems fundamental to one’s
parenting role. In other words, parents not only have a stake in the content of their decisions (the
specific care their children receive) but also in the freedom to make these decisions (the liberty to
direct and administer this care as they see fit.)
However, the legal rationale for protecting this liberty is not the personal significance of
parenthood as a relationship role. Parenting rights are protected via a well-established legal
tradition protecting privacy. A strong precedent set by the Supreme Court regards privacy as a
fundamental American liberty. Parenting rights, however, are protected by a weaker form of
privacy, family privacy. Family privacy is weaker than individual privacy because it inherently
interferes with children. I argue that there are two main conditions upon which privacy rights
rest: non-interference and productive use. This section will focus on the non-interference
condition: privacy rights are strengthened if their exercise exclusively impacts the individual
rights-bearer. Family privacy is necessarily weaker than individual privacy because it fails to
meet the non-interference condition.
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Parenting Rights are Privacy Rights

While there is no explicit right to raise children in the Constitution (children are not
mentioned) parenting rights are protected as fundamental liberties. The fundamental status of
parenting rights is tied to the doctrine of privacy which protects the domain of individual
households (separate from the domain of public civic life) from government intrusion.66 The
Supreme Court recognized parenting as a fundamental right in two foundational 1920s cases,
Meyer v. Nebraska ( 1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925.) In Meyer, t he Court
invalidated a Nebraska law barring foreign language education under which an instructor
teaching German had been convicted. The court held, “evidently the legislature has attempted
materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their
own.”67 In Pierce, the Court affirmed the fundamental parenting liberty protected in Meyer by
invalidating a state law that barred parents from enrolling their children in private schools. The
Court held that such an act "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."68 In Meyer and Pierce the
Court protected the autonomy of parents to direct children's upbringing as a fundamental liberty.
The designation of parenting rights as a fundamental in Meyer a nd Pierce was imbued
with renewed authority by the Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville (2000). Troxel affirmed the
status of parenting rights as fundamental and tied this status to the privacy of the family home.
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The Court in Troxel held, “There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best
interests, there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children.”
69

Troxel emphasized that parenting rights exist within a private sphere that should be

fundamentally protected from undue state intrusion.
The fact that parenting-decisions-as-personal-decisions are legally protected as a matter
of privacy seems at first a strange conflation of ‘personal’ and ‘private.’ While ‘personal’ may
ring true as a description of the experience of parenting for most parents, ‘private’ may seem less
tenable. One might expect that private matters would not leave the sphere of the home, affecting
only the private individual in question. Yet parenting decisions affect children who are not the
individual rights-bearers. Furthermore, parenting decisions often affect children’s lives outside of
the sphere of home in public places such as schools. While parenting rights may be necessary
and indeed personal, to characterize their personal and necessary nature as deriving from their
‘privacy’ rather than, say, the significance of parent-child relationships seems peculiar.
Many scholars understand the nature of parenting rights and the basis for their protection
through the framework of responsibility rather than privacy. Political theorist Jeremy Waldron’s
claim that “some rights are actually responsibilities”70 illustrates this perspective on the nature of
parenting rights. Waldron’s ‘responsibility rights’ are worthy of protection because they enable
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the rights-bearer to fulfill a responsibility beneficial to the public good. In the case of parenting
rights, the responsibility of raising and caring for children is considered a public good which
justifies the rights’ protection. A primary caretaker intermediate presumption might be justified
by a similar responsibility-based stance. The parent who had taken greater responsibility for the
child in the past might be entitled to stronger parental rights i.e. the ability to take greater
responsibility for the child in the future.71 In the following section, I will elaborate upon the
implications of parenting as a responsibility right in discussion of the productive use condition.
Privacy may be a necessary aspect of the protection of parenting rights but privacy alone
does not capture the nature of the right and the basis for its protection. Ethical claims such as the
responsibility and relationship significance of parenthood are critical aspects of why parenting is
(or should be) protected. Responsibility and relationship significance may be invoked in legal
articulations of privacy, but within the individualistic U.S. legal system, these factors are not its
defining characteristics.

Parenting Rights as Privacy Rights are Conditional

Like all privacy rights and many other fundamental liberties, parenting rights are
conditional. They are not absolute but rather contingent upon conditions rights-bearers must
meet. Many other constitutional rights are conditional; liberties that have the potential to harm
others are often constrained by conditions in order to mitigate their potential for harm. Yet
parenting rights are necessary weakened as a function of their conditionality.
71
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Conditions of privacy rights. The privacy right is contingent upon two conditions:
non-interference and productive use. Privacy rights are strengthened by these conditions
if they are met, diminished by them if they are unmet.

It helps to consider the conditions of privacy as having subconditions in order to
understand how parenting rights are weakened. The conditions are more likely to be met (and
privacy is more likely to be protected) if their subconditions are met. If unmet, their
subconditions decrease the likelihood of conditions being met, weakening the privacy right. ‘No
children involved’ is the subcondition of non-interference.

Sub-conditions of privacy rights. The privacy right is strengthened by the conditions
below it if they are met, diminished if they are unmet. The top conditions
(non-interference and productive use) are more likely to be met if the subconditions
below them are met and less likely to be met if the subconditions below them are unmet.
Note that the lowest subconditions (no children involved, wealth, whiteness) are
relatively more fact-based than the higher conditions (non-interference, productive use,
moral character.) The higher conditions are presumptions based upon the subconditions
below them.
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Parenting liberties are particularly conditional. So conditional, in fact, that scholar of law
and anthropology, Khiara Bridges, argues they do not exist for certain individuals. The
subcondition ‘no children involved’ is necessarily failed by parenting rights, as parenting rights
necessarily implicate children. Interference with children is an intrinsic structural part of what
parenting, by nature, entails.
In the following section I will define the productive use condition and argue that the
privacy of parenting rights is also contingent upon this condition. Family privacy is rendered
weaker yet for poor, often black mothers through this second unnecessary and detrimental
condition. As Bridges argues, the productive use condition renders the privacy rights of poor
mothers nonexistent.

Parenting Rights Necessarily Interfere With Children

Family privacy, the specific form of privacy which parenting rights belong to, is a more
limited basis for protection than individual privacy. This is partially due to the inevitable failure
of the first condition of privacy: non-interference. Parenting rights, unlike individual privacy
rights, inevitably interfere with children. Parenting rights are conditioned by this inevitable
impact because, while parenting rights pertain to decisions made by individual parents, the
decisions parents make for their children cause direct intentional outcomes for children. While
parenting choices may be recognized and protected as personal choices, they are not personal
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choices in the sense of choices that one makes by and for oneself alone. Rather, they are
‘personal’ in the sense that they are choices one makes within one’s intimate capacity to choose
for another person.

Family privacy. Children are necessarily and directly impacted by the exercise of
parenting rights. Because family privacy, which protects these rights, necessarily
interferes with non-rights-bearing children, the non-interference condition is unmet.
Family privacy is necessarily weakened by the inevitable failure of the non-interference
condition.

The failure of the non-interference condition is a fundamental part of the structure of
parenting rights. The actions which family privacy protects impact children who lack comparable
decision-making capacity to adult citizens, at least until they reach the age of majority and often
afterwards. Children’s privacy, if at all protected, is directly infringed upon by the exercise of
parenting rights. Children are so directly impacted by parenting rights that they may be
considered second non-rights-bearing subjects of these rights. Due to the inevitable impact upon
the second subject (the failure of the non-interference condition) there is greater potential for
parenting rights to enable harm. This suggests a connection between non-interference and the flip
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side of productive use, doing no harm. (I will discuss productive use and the presumption of
harm in the following section.)
The higher potential for harm due to necessary interference with children is good reason
for family privacy to be weaker than individual privacy. Family privacy is more vulnerable to
state intrusion because children are generally more vulnerable than adults. They are more often
in need of state protection. Because minors may be subjected to abuse or neglect by their parents
who are responsible for protecting them, the state may exercise its parens patriae powers to
assume responsibility for protecting children in the place of parents who abuse it. However, it is
critical to make this distinction, to distinguish family privacy as a weaker form of privacy, when
one considers the additional impact of the productive use condition, which diminishes and some
cases extinguishes privacy rights.

Individual Privacy is Stronger than Family Privacy Because it Meets the Non-Interference
Condition

A straightforward individual legal right to privacy is protected simply because its
associated conduct occurs within the private sphere. Family privacy complicates this protection,
because relationships and responsibilities are non-individual, non-negotiable parts of parenting.
These key aspects of family privacy differentiate it from individual privacy, making it a more
difficult right to protect.
One of the most foundational Supreme Court decisions that championed privacy rights is
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965.) Griswold cited Meyer and Pierce in majority and concurring
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opinions. However, while the justices referenced these foundational 1920s parenting rights cases,
they did not acknowledge the fundamental differences between family privacy and individual
privacy which render the rights they protected stronger than the rights protected in Meyer and
Pierce. Privacy could, in Griswold, be tied to the straightforward connotation of a married
couple’s bedroom as a private space. In the private sphere protected in Griswold the actions of
rights-bearers did not affect non-rights-bearers.
Griswold concerned the individual rights of two married, consenting adults to use
contraception within the privacy of their home. T
 he seven justices comprising the majority
shared the opinion that the Constitution protects a right to privacy though they differed on which
amendments this right could be derived from.72 Justice Goldberg, concurring though finding
support in the Ninth rather than Fourteenth Amendment, wrote, “Of this whole ‘private realm of
family life,’ it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations.”73 Here Goldberg ties privacy to non-interference. As Justice Goldberg’s
concurrence indicates, appealing to privacy in the sense of actions that do not affect others
(non-interference) strengthens the constitutional protection of privacy rights.
The fact that the Griswold majority protected the couples’ rights as fundamental despite
the lack of consensus on their derivation demonstrates the strength of the individual privacy
protected. Griswold offered what might be considered an unlikely degree protection to a right
defined nowhere in the Constitution. The Griswold majority even went so far as to protect rights
connected only indirectly to the ‘private individuals’ in question. Even though appellants in
Griswold were medical personnel whose right to distribute contraceptives were not directly the
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privacy rights of the married couple, Justice Douglas argued that to interfere with the physician’s
role would substantively interfere with the couple’s rights. He argued that the conduct of
physicians providing contraception must be protected by “peripheral rights”74 (versus rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.) The Court nonetheless found it necessary to protect these
rights in order to give substance to a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”75 Despite its
ambiguity the Griswold decision protected individual privacy with force.
Yet the privacy of individual adult actions protected in Griswold, contained within the
physical home and unlikely to affect those outside of it, is fundamentally different from the
privacy of families with children. Another case emblematic of the strengthening of individual
privacy via non-interference is Lawrence v. Texas (2003.) The thrust of the ‘individual’ aspect of
privacy present in Griswold and Lawrence and absent in Meyer and Pierce is that the private
conduct in Griswold and Lawrence did not interfere with non-rights-bearers. The Court in
Lawrence protected the rights of individuals to engage in intimate sexual conduct within the
private sphere of the home. Lawrence cited Griswold and Eisenstadt v. Baird ( 1972) (expanding
Griswold.) The Court held, "it is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."76 The family
privacy of parenting rights protected in Meyer and Pierce stands in contrast to the individual
privacy protected in Griswold and Lawrence. B
 ecause parenting privacy rights do not meet the
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non-interference condition emphasized in Griswold and Lawrence they are necessarily
weakened.
Individual privacy is constructed as a negative liberty (freedom from state intervention)
which is easier to protect than the positive liberty formulation of family privacy, ‘the freedom to
raise children.’ The negative liberty is contingent upon sphere: conduct need only occur within a
private sphere to be protected. The positive liberty construction, on the other hand, invites
judicial examination into the private home to consider the conduct and determine whether the
liberty is deserved. A liberty contingent upon sphere is protected concretely as a matter of place
while a liberty contingent upon conduct may be revoked by a subjective judgement of conduct.
In Lawrence the protection of parenting rights hinged upon whether or not the rights interfered
with others (the Court found that they did not.) Yet parenting privacy rights necessarily interfere
with children. Thus, parenting rights hinge upon whether or not their interference is deemed
acceptable.
Parents who are the subject of child protective proceedings, accused of harming their
children, cannot claim that their parenting liberties do not interfere with their children. Thus,
their necessary interference is scrutinized. One might argue that defining conduct (whether one is
acting in the capacity of a parent) is no more difficult than determining sphere (whether one is
acting privately within one’s home.) However, in the following section I will argue that the
question upon which parenting rights are contingent is not whether one is acting as a parent but
rather whether one is acting as a good parent–a far more subjective inquiry.
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Family Privacy is Necessarily Weaker than Individual Privacy Because Privacy is
Protected as an Individual Liberty

In an individualistic and adversarial legal system, the invocation of privacy as protection
for parenting rights makes clear sense. One of the most fundamental concepts in U.S. political
thought is the separation of the private and public spheres wherein private actions are better
protected from government interference because they concern only the individual actors.77 If
rights are fundamentally understood as things that attach to individual persons and privacy (in
the straightforward, individualistic sense) is contingent upon non-interference, the condition of
only impacting the individual actor then privacy rights must be protected by virtue of being
individual rights. In other words, is easier to protect a right within an individualistic system when
the exercise of that right impacts only the individual rights-bearer. With the dominant legal
ideology of individualism in mind, it is clear why individual privacy is a strong basis for legal
protection. However, when a privacy right does not conform to the individualistic model, how is
can its protection be secured?
While the Troxel C
 ourt may have protected family privacy as a fundamental liberty, the
way in which it recognized privacy as it applies to the family unit was still individualistic. It
recognized parenting rights are as the rights of individual parents to raise their children, not
collective rights of a family unit. In the child welfare system, state intrusion, the violation of
privacy, takes the form of the separation of children and parents. Privacy constructed
individualistically does not form a strong basis for protection against this violation. Especially
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for families whose privacy has historically been diminished, the child welfare system treats the
rights of parents as necessarily in conflict with the rights of children, constructed as victimized
individuals. The strength of individualism codified in U.S. law and culture ensures that the
privacy of families as interdependent groups is poorly protected. Not only does the doctrine of
privacy refuse to recognize rights as belonging to families collectively, but it also protects rights
specifically because they pertain to individuals and supposedly no one else.78
Yet when families are at risk of being separated in child protective proceedings, it is
collective, rather than individual privacy that is in need of legal recognition. To adequately
protect against state interference, judges need to recognize the essential differences between
family privacy and individual privacy. This involves recognizing the potential for harm to
non-rights-bearing individuals as well as the non-individualistic reasons for protecting parenting
rights such as parenting responsibility and parent-child relationships. Courts’ interpretations of
privacy rights must acknowledge the non-individual reasons for privacy’s protection.

4. The Individualization of Poverty and The Productive Use Condition

“There are separate systems for poor and for wealthier families. Public child welfare
departments that investigate child maltreatment and place children in out-of-home care
handle almost exclusively problems of poor families.”
-
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In Section 3, I argued that privacy rights are intrinsically conditional. Parenting rights
necessarily fail one of the privacy right conditions (the non-interference condition) because
raising children by definition entails interfering with children.79 In an individualistic legal
system, parenting rights are weaker than individual privacy rights due to their failure to meet the
non-interference condition. They are less individual and therefore less well-protected.
This section shifts focus to the right branch of privacy right conditions: ‘productive use’
and its subconditions. If the exercise of a privacy right is presumed to generate social value, it
meets the productive use condition. If it is presumed to generate no social value or negative
social value, it fails the productive use condition. Like the non-interference condition, failure to
meet the productive use condition diminishes privacy rights. Understanding how the productive
use condition functions, how its negation diminishes parenting rights, illustrates the greater threat
of the indeterminacy problem to parents and children in the child welfare system.

Differences Between Divorce and Child Welfare Custody Cases Render Indeterminacy
Mobilized by the Productive Use Condition a Greater Threat in the Latter

There are several relevant differences between child welfare custody cases and divorce
custody cases. The main difference is that a divorce case is initiated by the dissolution of a
marriage, whereas a child protective case is initiated by an allegation of child abuse or neglect. A
second major difference is the relative positions of litigants. In divorce cases, the parties are
usually two parents; in child protective cases, the parties are usually a parent or parents versus a
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state agency. The parent or family is usually fighting to retain custody of the child while the
child protective agency is attempting to place or keep the child in state custody. While two
parents in a divorce case may have different resources, their rights are essentially the same:
parenting rights are fundamental privacy rights. In child protective cases, the state agency and
parent(s) are on less equal footing in terms of rights. Their claims to the child are not the same or
even parallel. The state’s claim is not a fundamental privacy right, but rather, as discussed in
Section 2, a function of its parens patriae power.
While the fundamental concern at hand in child protective proceedings is still ‘the best
interests of the child,’ the question before the judge is formulated differently. When a judge
assesses the best interests of the child in a divorce case they are usually deciding which of two
parents the child should primarily live with. In child protective proceedings, on the other hand,
the judge is usually tasked with determining whether a child should be removed from its parents’
home. The assessment of ‘best interests,’ thus, is not a question of which parent would be a
better primary caretaker, but rather whether it is in a child’s ‘best interests’ to stay within a
parent’s care.
Under these different questions, different arguments become advantageous. Both parties
in divorce cases have fundamental privacy rights and either may win custody without proving the
other unfit. In child protective cases, the state has no pre-existing right to custody.80 Winning
custody, for the agency, requires disqualifying a parent as ‘unfit’ because the state has no claim
to the child if the parent’s claim cannot be diminished. The state can only can activate its parens
patriae powers if it can convince the court of parental unfitness.

Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57. (Citing Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct.
2493 Asserting that states can’t intervene in the private home unless parents are proven unfit)
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Put differently, a state agency, unlike a parent, has no right to the child independent from
that child’s interests. The only leverage the state has in a custody dispute must therefore be
framed within the child’s ‘best interests.’ A parent in a divorce custody case need only show that
the child would be better off in their care. A state agency, on the other hand, cannot assert merely
the benefits of agency custody over parental custody as an invocation of ‘best interests.’ For a
state to argue that a child would be better off in foster care (when they would be fine left at
home) would not only be evidently insincere to most people familiar with the foster care system,
but would also not be enough alone to justify removing the child. Because a state agency can
only invoke parens patriae powers if it can prove a parent unfit, to assert the benefits of agency
over parental custody is not an advantageous argument for the state to make. Thus state agency
arguments in child protective proceedings are generally not about what serves children best but
rather what disqualifies parents from the privacy rights that would protect them from state
interference.
Parenting Rights are Conditioned by The Social Value Their Exercise is Presumed
to Generate, The ‘Productive Use’ Condition

The productive use condition. Productive use is the second condition privacy rights are
contingent upon. If a privacy right is presumed to generate social value, it meets the
productive use condition. If it is presumed to generate no social value or negative social
value, it fails the productive use condition. The negation of the productive use condition
diminishes parenting rights.
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When a parent has been deemed unfit, empowering the state to take custody of a child,
one can understand the parent’s rights as having been diminished by a failure to meet the
productive use condition. Under the productive use condition, privacy rights are strengthened
when their exercise is presumed to produce social value and weakened when their exercise is
presumed not to produce social value. Parental fitness, defined via the productive use condition,
hinges upon the social good one’s child-rearing is presumed to generate. This supports a
particular mobilization of the best interests standard in the child welfare system; it prompts an
inquiry into the value generated by the exercise of the parent’s rights and a focus on the parent
rather than the child.
The argument in this section is based largely upon the work of legal theorist and
ethnographer, Khiara Bridges. In The Poverty of Privacy Rights (2017), Bridges untangles the
cultural assumptions that comprise the productive use condition, explicating the relationship
between the condition and its subconditions. Bridges argues that the condition acts as a vehicle
for cultural, historic patterns of racism and classism enacted in the child welfare system. I
represent Bridge’s argument through the right branch of conditions in the privacy rights diagram.
Productive use is unlike non-interference in a fundamental way: it is not intrinsically tied to the
nature or structure of parenting, but rather, it is selectively enforced in accordance with dominant
social ideologies, and often not in accordance with the interests of children.
Bridges prefaces the productive use condition by asserting that privacy, as a fundamental
liberty, is generally protected because of an (individualist) cultural assumption that privacy
contributes to public good. The strength of a privacy right depends upon the public good its
exercise is presumed to produce. The value of privacy is therefore, not an intrinsic value (privacy

51

for privacy’s sake) but rather an instrumental value (privacy for social benefit.) The state justifies
its interference with privacy, its claims to child custody, as a means of ensuring that privacy as
an instrumental good is being put to productive use. Bridges argues that the claim that privacy is
an instrumental good helps to explain why privacy rights may be weakened or revoked when
they do not generate or appear to generate value.
There is a particular way in which the indeterminacy of the best interest standard is
mobilized under the productive use condition. Whether or not a parent is using their privacy
rights to raise children ‘productively’ is a fundamentally different inquiry from ‘What is in the
child’s best interests?’ Whether or not a parent is using their privacy rights productively also
requires a more subjective assessment than that of the non-interference condition. If a child is
involved, as is the case in the exercise of all parenting rights, the non-interference condition is
clearly unmet. Yet the inquiry the productive use condition prompts is not as straightforward. A
focus upon this condition, in the child welfare system, allows for the best interests standard to be
mobilized via judgements about whose child-rearing is ‘productive,’ whose decisions to raise
children contribute to the public good.

Wealth and Whiteness are Subconditions of the Productive Use Condition Because
of a Moral Construction of Poverty

Bridges argues that the ‘productive use’ mobilization of the best interests standard in
child protective proceedings strips poor, often black mothers of privacy rights. This means that
when the parent in a child protective proceeding is a poor mother neither the state nor the parent

52

has a fundamental privacy right: there is no fundamental right w
 hich the state must diminish in
order to remove a child from their home.81 Bridge’s central claim is that poor mothers are not
given privacy rights because they are presumed to fail the productive use condition. “The law
presumes that their enjoyment of privacy will realize no value or a negative value.”82 The
“invasion of poor womens’ privacy,” when a state agency removes a child from their home, is
therefore “argued to be an unfortunate yet inevitable consequence” of ensuring that the mother’s
privacy rights are being put to productive use.83 Why do poor mothers presumptively fail the
productive use condition? Poverty, under the productive use condition, is taken as evidence
against productivity.

Family privacy of poor black mothers. Bridges argues that privacy rights are nonexistent
for poor black mothers, because dominant cultural ideology conflates black poverty with
poor moral character, and presumes that poor moral character precludes the productive
use of privacy rights. Here, Bridges’ argument (right branch of the diagram) is framed
within the broader argument that family privacy is necessarily weaker than individual
privacy, because parenting necessarily interferes with children (left branch of the
diagram.)
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The ‘moral construction of poverty’ refers to a dominant cultural narrative of poverty as
an individual, moral problem. It describes the cultural associative ties between wealth, whiteness,
positive moral character and a presumption that one contributes productively to society. Wealth
is conflated with positive moral character, and conversely, poverty with moral (individual)
deficiency. The moral construction of poverty is an “individualist idea that people are poor
because there is something wrong with them” or “behaviorally and/or ethically flawed (their
poverty proves as much.)”84 It assumes that poor mothers will not put their privacy rights to
good, ‘productive’ use. The perception of poverty as a sign of individual moral deficiency is
furthered by racial stereotypes deeply rooted in U.S. history and culture. The result, Bridges
argues, is that poor mothers, many of whom are black, have no actual privacy rights.
Understanding the implications of the moral construction of poverty requires the
acceptance of a premise critical legal theorists such as Martha Fineman propose: the law is not
independent from culture; rather, the law is fundamentally a tool of culture. The use of law to
change culture may be effective but only insofar as it entails the appropriation of a tool against
its intended use.85 If one accepts this relationship between law and culture, the cultural moral
construction of poverty can be seen to shape (the deprivation of) real legal privacy rights.
Bridges describes the same relationship between culture and law: the “individualist, moralizing
explanation for poverty accepted by society” and “the architects of these laws and the jurists that
interpret these laws [through the productive use condition] as consistent with the Constitution.”86
The denial of rights to poor, often black mothers whose child-rearing is deemed ‘unproductive’
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by the moral construction of poverty gives force to the structural biases the productive use
condition is built upon.

Racism Perpetuates the Moral Construction of Poverty

The power of the moral construction of poverty relies upon cultural attitudes made
possible by a history of racial subordination in the U.S. Without considering this history, the
claim that privacy rights are not universal but conditional, and that individuals might be stripped
of privacy rights “on the basis of presumed shortcomings,”87 is more difficult to accept. Bridges
emphasizes that the “dispossession of privacy rights based upon poverty disproportionately
affects black parents because black parents are disproportionately represented among the poor.88
According to a 2015 child poverty report, one in three black children are poor compared to one
in eight white children.89 While poverty increases the likelihood of a parent’s inability to provide
for their children, poverty alone does not constitute child neglect. However, poor black women
are deemed ‘unproductive’ via the moral construction of poverty merely for raising children.
Racist cultural attitudes validate perceptions of poor black mothers as unfit parents, perpetuating
a conflation of black poverty and child neglect.
The moral construction of poverty is pervasive not only throughout U.S. media and
popular culture, but also within legal and political discourses. One influential instance of the
moral construction of poverty in politics originated in a report by the U.S. Department of Labor
under the Johnson administration in 1965. ‘The Negro Family: The Case For National Action’
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also known as the ‘Moynihan Report’ legitimized a construction of black poverty as the result of
problems intrinsic to black culture. The author of the report, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, attributed
the high rate of black poverty to the high rate of single mothers in predominantly black
neighborhoods.90 Moynihan blamed black poverty on black culture and family norms rather than
cultural racism or economic structural forces. Moynihan, a Democrat from New York, served
multiple terms as senator and was an adviser to President Nixon. The Moynihan Report
influenced liberal welfare policy as well as political narratives about race and poverty.91
Racism also influences disparate applications of the same child welfare laws. A study
conducted by child welfare researcher Janet Dolgin compared different outcomes of child
protective proceedings in which parental substance use was a factor, where the substance in
question had a racialized cultural association. The study compared cases in which the substance
at hand was ‘crack’ cocaine (associated in U.S. media with poor black communities) versus cases
in which the substance at hand was cocaine hydrochloride (associated in U.S. media with
wealthy white communities.) The study found, above any other factor, “a strong tendency of
courts to base neglect determinations against parents who misuse drugs and alcohol on the
parents' social and financial class.”92 Parents using ‘crack’ cocaine were perceived to be more
dangerous to their children despite the chemical similarities between ‘crack’ cocaine and cocaine
hydrochloride. Cultural attitudes about race rooted in the U.S. history of racial subordination
contribute to the moral construction of poverty in political, legal, and cultural discourses and
subsequently the child welfare system.
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The claims of the Moynihan Report and the racial bias suggested by Dolgin’s study have
been present in U.S. culture, law and politics since the founding of the nation, during slavery,
and they persist in modern times. Bridges writes,
“Age old cultural discourses construct individuals racialized as black as
pathological—as indolent, as sexually incontinent, and criminally inclined, and so forth.
When those who comprise the poor are disproportionately black, then it is consistent with
extant cultural discourses to suppose that the poor are poor because they are
pathological—because they are indolent sexually incontinent, criminally inclined, and so
forth. Moreover, when those who are denied privacy rights in the basis of an ostensible
race-neutral criterion-presumed character—are disproportionately black, race explains
why the country finds this result “politically acceptable.”93
The moral construction of poverty helps to explain the overrepresentation of poor and
black children in the foster care system. Poverty is not taken merely as a risk factor, correlated
with child neglect. Poverty, constructed as an individual, moral, racialized problem, is taken as
evidence itself of child neglect. The vast majority of child protective cases (74.9 percent)
concern allegations of neglect rather than abuse.94 In 1994, child welfare researcher Duncan
Lindsey, found that "studies clearly demonstrate that child abuse is not the major reason children
are removed from their parents." Rather, "inadequacy of income, more than any other factor,
constitutes the reason that children are removed.”95 Because child neglect is often ambiguously
defined and shares many of the characteristics of poverty, allegations of neglect are much more
difficult than allegations of abuse to parse from poverty.
Child welfare policy researchers Joy Duva and Sania Metzger describe the conflation of
poverty with child neglect: “While state definitions of child neglect may vary, they often involve
93
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a primary caretaker knowingly or negligently allowing a minor child to be deprived of the basic
necessities of food, clothing, shelter, or care (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2007).
Poverty, however, is also defined in terms of inadequate food, shelter, and clothing. As a result,
poverty can be mistaken for and labeled as neglect.”96
Yet the term ‘mistaken’ evokes merely individual misjudgements. Above poverty,
receiving public assistance is the greatest predictor of involvement in the child welfare system.
Dorothy Roberts writes, “children from families who relieve welfare are at the greatest risk for
involvement in the child welfare system, especially for neglect. Researchers estimate that half of
the families referred to child protective services received welfare at the time of referral.”97 The
incidental individual misjudgements of agencies and courts, the mere confusion of poverty with
neglect, does not explain why poor families are punished for seeking state assistance in order to
remedy the conditions of poverty that might lead to child neglect.
Roberts argues that the explanation for poverty as a risk factor cannot merely be that
child maltreatment is more common among the poor. It would be less tenable yet to claim that
being on welfare encourages child maltreatment. While the receipt of public assistance might be
an indicator of poverty, it might just as easily be taken as an indicator of poor families’ efforts to
provide children with food, shelter, and clothing--to prevent child neglect. Public assistance
likely alleviates some of the stresses of poverty and improves children’s living conditions.
Instead, Roberts argues that poor families are more likely to be reported to state agencies
and reports of maltreatment by poor families are more likely to be confirmed by judges due to
the moral construction of poverty. Roberts argues, “raising children in poverty looks like
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parental unfitness if you believe that poor people are responsible for their own predicament and
are negative role models for their children.”98 A more tenable explanation for why receiving
welfare is the strongest predictive factor for involvement in the child welfare system is that state
involvement in one aspect of family life enables state surveillance in another.

Individualism Perpetuates the Moral Construction of Poverty

Individualism as a dominant legal and cultural norm plays a critical role in the moral
construction of poverty, the bias given force by the productive use condition. In addition to
rendering family privacy (the form of privacy rights parenting belong to) weaker than individual
privacy, individualism furthers a narrative that poverty is not a social problem but an individual
one. Poverty is seen as evidence of an individual’s inability to succeed due to the individual’s
deficient moral character. Yet Bridges argues that U.S. cultural conceptions of poverty are not
universally individualistic. Rather, dominant cultural narratives acknowledge the structural
nature of poverty when the face of poverty is white, but construe the poverty of black families as
a deserved consequence of individual behavioral or moral deficiencies.99 Both the
individualization of privacy as well as the moral, racialized construction of poverty allows for
the instrumental mobilization of the best interests standard via cultural, historic biases, against
poor, often black mothers in the child welfare system.
As I argued in Section 3, individual privacy rights, unlike family privacy rights, are
strengthened by their individual impact. Poor mothers do not have the kind of individual privacy
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protected in Lawrence and Griswold, in which the individual nature of conduct strengthens the
protection of rights. In these cases, it is precisely the individuality of the actor and the sphere of
the action separate from public communal life that affords privacy greater protection. Yet the
constructed individuality of poverty is precisely what strips poor mothers of privacy rights in
child protective cases. As Bridges argues, the more ‘personal’ the construction of one’s poverty,
the less protected one’s privacy rights become.

Child Protective Cases share Prosecutorial Characteristics with Criminal Cases
“The point of a CPS investigation is to divest the family and the members that constitute
it of privacy so that they may become visible to the state, enabling the state to determine
whether the parents are competent to raise their children without ongoing intervention
and regulation.”
-

Khiara Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights (2017) p. 10

Like divorce custody cases, child protective proceedings are civil law cases adjudicated
in family court. Accordingly, the question in child protective proceedings should not be the guilt
or innocence of the parent(s) as it would be in a criminal trial but rather the best interests of the
child. Yet custody scholars note that child protective proceedings, due to their focus on parental
misconduct, share characteristics with criminal trials. Family law scholar Douglas Besharov
argues,
“It is a mistake to ignore, or deny, the essentially prosecutorial function of the
attorneys who assist [state agencies in child protective proceedings] …The benign
purposes of child protective proceedings should not obscure the fact that they may result
in a intrusion into family life. . . . [Such a proceeding] ‘by its very nature resembles a
criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with conduct - failure to care properly for
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her children - which may be criminal and which in any event viewed as reprehensible and
morally wrong by a majority of society’”100
Like the criminal justice system, the child welfare system in major cities is expansive and
largely privatized. In 2018, the New York State child protective agency, The Administration for
Children's’ Services or ACS was involved with 49,876 children.101 ACS placed 3,805 children
into foster care.102 With parenting rights predicated upon a racialized moral construction of
poverty, the child welfare system, like the prison system, is one of the most racially segregated
institutions in the United States.103 There are significant racial disparities between the cases the
agencies choose to pursue in court, and from these cases, which children eventually end up in
foster care.104 In 2016, twenty-three percent of children in foster care in the U.S. were black,
while forty-four percent were white.105 Black children were more than twice as likely to be
placed in foster care than white children.106
However, the child welfare system and criminal justice system are not only similar
insofar as they are built upon similar systemic biases; they are also functionally connected.
According to a 2015 Children’s Bureau report, almost one-fifth of reports to U.S. child
protective agencies were made by police (approximately four hundred thousand reports
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nationally.)107 Criminal justice researcher, Frank Edwards describes the centrality of police
participation in the “diffuse surveillance system formalized by mandated reporting laws” in the
child welfare system.108 Every state has some form of mandated reporting laws, which require all
adults or specific professionals to report any instance of suspected child abuse or neglect to child
protective agencies.109
Edwards notes that police already fulfil a role in state surveillance, and unlike other
mandatory reporters, “police can gain access to observe the daily lives of children and families at
home with or without the consent of a subject family.”110 Edwards’ research indicates that
“police file more reports of child abuse and neglect in counties with high arrest rates.”111 If
interactions with police are more likely to lead to child protective investigations where
interactions with police are more common, and if interactions with police are more common (and
more likely to escalate) in poor and black neighborhoods, then the near one-fifth of reports to
child protective agencies initiated by police directly contribute to the disproportionate
representation of poor and black children in the child welfare system.
In Section 3, I argued that parenting rights are an intrinsically weaker form of privacy
right due to their failure of the non-interference condition. Parenting rights are further weakened
by the contingency of privacy rights upon the moral construction of poverty via the productive
use condition. Parenting rights as privacy rights are thus doubly diminished. First, as a function
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of the intrinsic nature of parenting rights whereby children are necessarily always affected,
secondly, by the moral construction of poverty as individual failure. Poor mothers are often
black, and race plays a critical role in their access to rights in the U.S. legal system. The moral
construction of poverty perpetuates a race and class-based notion of who deserves to raise
children, who is entitled to privacy and due process, and whose hardship signifies an inability to
parent rather than a broken social security net.
The productive use condition is not responsive to actual productivity (if it could be
quantified in child-rearing) but rather to assumptions about productivity based upon the moral
construction of poverty. It is not about an actual value produced, but rather expected value. Poor,
often black mothers, are not assumed to produce social value by raising children. The moral
construction of poverty provides the connection between productive use and poverty as its
subcondition. Because a moral construction of poverty negates the productive use condition, and
in the case of parenting rights the non-interference condition is already failed, poor, often black
mothers in the child welfare system do not have privacy rights.

Conclusion

Individualism as a legal and political norm allows for the mobilization of the best
interests standard via systemic biases in the child welfare system in four ways: First, through the
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misperception of bias in child protective disputes as ‘individual’ and ‘incidental,’ disconnected
from the history and structure of our legal system and state. Secondly, through the construction
of the individual child victim in need of state protection, erasing the victimization of poor
families. Additionally, through the diminishment of family privacy rights because their impact is
non-individual. Finally, through the construction of parents’ poverty as individual rather than
societal failure.
Section 1 surveyed the indeterminacy problem of the best interests standard, and
concluded that the legal system is a blunt instrument at best for advancing the interests of
children. Yet if indeterminacy impedes this purpose in divorce cases, it can be seen to serve a
contrary purpose within the child welfare system. The vagueness of the best interests standard
and the frequent impossibility Elster asserts of objective assessment enable judges to consider
factors other than the best interests of the child. The productive use condition (discussed in
Section 4) is one such non-child factor. Judgements about whether poor mothers are using their
privacy rights productively act as proxy for the best interests of the child.
Yet the influence of this non-child factor is not an incidental result of individual bias. The
moral construction of poverty which the productive use condition is built upon is deeply rooted
in U.S. history and culture. Indeterminacy, in and of itself, is not as dangerous as the routine,
systematic practices of economic and racial subordination it enables in the child welfare system.
It is not that classist and racist assumptions never influence indeterminate applications of the best
interests standard in divorce cases, but rather that the different positions of litigants in child
protective proceedings, in addition to the shift in emphasis towards parental misconduct,
facilitates the routine deprivation of poor, often black mothers’ privacy rights.
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Could indeterminacy in child protective proceedings be resolved by a coin toss? Before
the state had proven its case to activate its parens patriae powers, the coin toss would give it a 50
percent chance of gaining custody. The parent, who had not yet been proven unfit, would face a
50 percent chance of losing their child to foster care. The parent and state agency do not have
equal stakes in child custody. This asymmetry changes the nature of the potential unfairness in
child protective proceedings, and is the reason why the indeterminacy of the best interests
standard is a bigger, more complex problem in the child welfare system.
The best interests standard’s indeterminacy makes room for the exacerbation of
asymmetry between the state and poor parents, families who have cards already stacked against
them. What a vague standard means for two similarly-situated parents litigating for custody is
critically different f rom what broad discretion means in the hands of a judge assessing the ‘best
interests’ of a child of a poor family at risk of being put into foster care. For a poor parent whose
poverty is pathologized as personal irresponsibility, indeterminacy is far greater threat. For this
parent, the slippage from ‘assessment of fitness for custody’ to ‘judgement of personal worth,’
indeterminacy mobilized by the productive use condition, becomes exponentially more
dangerous.
The productive use condition is central to the child welfare indeterminacy problem. In
child protective proceedings the litigants, the questions, and the arguments are not the same as in
divorce custody cases. Under the productive use condition, parenting rights and true inquiries
into children’s best interests are eclipsed by cultural assumptions about guilt, immorality,
poverty and presumed contribution to public good: who deserves privacy rights and whose
child-rearing is seen as generating social good or harm. These value judgements are not the
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product of variable, individual bias, but rather produced by cultural biases rooted in historic
patterns of subordination. Furthermore, perception of these biases through an individualist
framework (as in most formulations of the indeterminacy problem) disguises their extent and
nature. The indeterminacy of the standard, mobilized by these assumptions, works not only to the
detriment of parents’ interests, but also to the detriment of the interests and wellbeing of
children.
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